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Resumo∗ 
A origem e as causas da crise financeira europeia são analisadas. Dívida, 
desequilíbrios orçamentários, recessão e desemprego são as imagens da 
Europa de hoje. Esses problemas vêm sendo tratados com medidas 
voltadas aos interesses dos credores de corte de gasto público e aumento 
de impostos. Qual a perspectiva de a União Europeia (EU) reconquistar seu 
“momentum” em termos de integração econômica e imagem? Há outro 
caminho de saída da crise diferente de um prolongado regime de 
austeridade? A forte onda esquerdista das recentes eleições na Grã-             
-Bretanha, na França e na Grécia foi vista como sinal de uma oposição do 
sentimento popular contra a quebra da rede de seguridade social e das 
despesas públicas em geral como solução para os problemas 
orçamentários, mas quanto isso pode se traduzir em mudança nas posições 
seguidas pela União Europeia e pelo Banco Central Europeu? Ou será que 
a UE está dirigindo-se sem esperança para uma fratura não apenas da 
Zona do Euro, mas também de seus outros instrumentos de integração 
econômica? O crescimento de forças nacionalistas de direita na Hungria, na 
França e, em menor intensidade, também na Grécia são indicativo nessa 
direção. Antes de tratar da questão central, é necessário começar por 
algumas questões fundamentais sobre o euro como sistema monetário e 
seu lugar na economia mundial. Ao final, algumas conclusões são tiradas da 
presente crise do euro em relação ao estado da teoria econômica em geral, 
conclusões que podem ser relevantes para o debate entre economistas no 
Hemisfério Sul.  
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Abstract 
The origin and causes of European financial crisis is analyzed. Debt, 
budgetary imbalances, economic recession and unemployment are the 
figures of today’s Europe. Those problems are been cope with measures 
targeting creditors interests of cutting public expenditures and rising taxes. 
What are the prospects for the European Union to regain its momentum in 
terms of economic integration and image? Is there a way out of the crisis 
other than that of a prolonged austerity regime? The strong leftward swing in 
the recent elections in UK, France and Greece have been seen as a sign of 
a popular mood opposing a continued crackdown on social security nets and 
public expenditures in general as a solution to present budgetary problems, 
but how far can this be translated into changes of the main orientations of 
the EU and its central bank, the ECB? Or is the European Union helplessly 
driving towards a break-up not only of the Eurozone but also of its other 
instruments of economic integration? The rise of right-wing nationalist forces 
in Hungary, France and to a lesser extent also in Greece might suggest this. 
Before going into the subject matter it is necessary to start with some 
fundamental questions regarding the euro as a monetary system and its 
place in the world economy. At the end, some conclusions will be drawn 
from the present euro crisis concerning the state of general economic theory, 
conclusions that might have salience also for debates among economists in 
the southern hemisphere. 
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Introduction 
 
Some years ago the process of enlargement and integration of the 
European Union was widely considered among Latin Americans as a 
successful attempt of constructing a larger area of economic and political 
cooperation that could be used as an example to learn from. Whereas the 
different attempts in Latin America such as CAN, Mercosur and CEPAL had 
fluctuating and variating fortunes much dependent on political conjunctures 
the development of the European Economic Community into a European 
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Union seemed to be a continuous process with much larger scope and 
depth. It was also an image that the EU representatives sought to project in 
all fields of their cooperation with regional partners in South America and 
Africa. 
This impression seemed to be confirmed by the haphazardness of the 
development of the US economy in the last decade: it was the prime locus of 
the bust of the IT-bubble in 2000, and the US government tried to restart the 
economy by a consumer driven growth with untenable deficits in both trade 
balances and capital accounts only to end in the financial meltdown of the 
subprime-crisis epitomized by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
But after 2009 this impression of European Union as a success model 
has changed profoundly. As in all other developed economies the ratio of 
public indebtedness has risen sharply in almost all of the EU member states, 
whether being part of the Eurozone or not. However the peculiarities of the 
monetary policies and especially the role supranational role of the euro have 
quickly produced financial crises, in turn developing to political and social 
crises threatening the whole fabric of the European Union. 
Given the economic weight of the European Union, with its 350 million 
citizens and a combined GDP equalling that of the United States the future 
of the EU is a question that is not only of regional concern, it will a factor 
influencing geopolitical arrangements and the development of the world 
economy as a whole. 
What are the prospects for the European Union to regain its momentum 
in terms of economic integration and image? Is there a way out of the crisis 
other than that of a prolonged austerity regime? The strong leftward swing in 
the recent elections in UK, France and Greece have been seen as a sign of 
a popular mood opposing a continued crackdown on social security nets and 
public expenditures in general as a solution to present budgetary problems, 
but how far can this be translated into changes of the main orientations of 
the EU and its central bank, the ECB? 
Or is the European Union helplessly driving towards a break-up not only 
of the Eurozone but also of its other instruments of economic integration? 
The rise of right-wing nationalist forces in Hungary, France and to a lesser 
extent also in Greece might suggest this. 
Before going into the subject matter it is necessary to start with some 
fundamental questions regarding the euro as a monetary system and its 
place in the world economy. 
At the end, some conclusions will be drawn from the present euro crisis 
concerning the state of general economic theory, conclusions that might 
have salience also for debates among economists in the southern 
hemisphere. 
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1 This is not a crisis of the euro — it is the 
third phase of the ongoing global   
financial crisis 
 
The discussions concerning the untenable rises of the ratio of public 
indebtedness in the last year have been focusing mostly on individual 
countries within the European Union: Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy. The Anglo-Saxon pink sheet economic newspapers have dubbed them 
the PIIGS-countries, an abbreviation with a sense of humour that smacks of 
contempt. And then many — mostly in United States and Great Britain — 
have seen it as an evidence that the euro-project was wrong all along. They 
evidently abhor as well the idea of the euro as a competitor to the US dollar 
as the prospect of the continental marketplaces challenging the role of the 
City of London. Undoubtedly there are inconsistencies in the creation of the 
European Monetary Union and its currency. One thing must however be very 
clear: the crisis within the euro system is above all a part of the deeper 
global financial crisis that has continued since the crash of US mortgage 
market and the Lehman Brothers in 2008. The fact that UK is not part of the 
euro have not prevented Great Britain’s economy from running untenable 
deficits. Deficits that the current conservative government is now trying to 
tackle with measures of slash down in public expenditures as harsh as most 
of those used by his counterparts in the Eurozone countries. 
Nor has the fact that the financial policies of the United States are the 
opposite from that of the EU countries saved it from running into an 
indebtedness that exceeds 15 trillion US dollars, more than its gross GDP. 
The euro crisis is the third phase of an ongoing crisis process. The two 
first ones were characterized by the massive rescue plans to banks and 
industries to save the financial metabolism from a thrombosis and the drastic 
slowdown of growth in the US and EU economies due to the new conditions 
of uncertainty.  
Still this larger financial settings have brought the frailties of the euro-         
-system and its weaker links in a drastic lime-light. To these I will now turn. 
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2 The euro-zone: is it an adequate monetary 
area? 
 
Today there are 17 countries in Europe that have the euro as a 
common currency.1 More are in the wings. The euro-zone countries have 
together a GDP at par with that of the United States and a consumer market 
of 7.700 billion euros, next only to that of the US. 
It is in itself an enormous feat to merge the currencies of different 
countries in this way. It was done in two steps. The ratification of the Single 
European Act of 1986 was in principle instituting the free mobility of goods, 
capital and labor between the member states of the Union. And with the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 a set of budgetary principles — mainly of German 
inspiration — were set as well as a timetable for establishing a common 
currency. According to the promoters, among them Jacques Delors — 
French socialist heading the European Commission 1986-1994 — it should 
lead to higher efficiency and increased growth. Still the growth was rather 
lagging behind that of the US its first ten years and the system is now in 
deep crisis. Even if the dimension of the problems of public debt in some 
countries have been exacerbated these last years these problems are only a 
symptom of deeper abnormities within the construction of the common 
currency. 
What are the advantages with a larger monetary area, according to 
theory? The first one is that it increases the stability in the interregional trade 
since the weapon of competitive devaluations is no longer available within 
the Eurozone. This larger stability will also stimulate a wider market 
integration and larger markets paves the way for increased competition, 
higher efficiency and  higher productivity. That is in theory. 
There are however some preconditions for these theories to hold: 
- The benefits of free competition holds only as far as completion is 
really free. And the competition can be considered to be free only if 
productivity levels are not to different. Brazilian football players don’t 
need to do their best when meeting Swedes, they will win anyhow. 
The pressure towards the maximum efficiency would not hold in 
such a case. 
- The mobility of factors has to be general: not only goods and capital 
but also labour has to be mobile. 
- On the macro level the degree of interdependency is important. The 
business cycles have to be closely related for an economic policy to 
be efficient. 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
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- And the theory in itself has a time problem: the adjustment process 
towards higher efficiency is not instantaneous. For the theory to hold 
historical experience has showed the need of an active regional and 
countercyclical intervention from a strong state. 
These conditions are in fact badly meet in the euro countries.  
There are vast disparities in productivity levels between the euro 
countries, especially between its six founding countries and the latecomers. 
Even within the founding members the disparities in industrial structure has 
proved to be major obstacles: Italy’s dramatic differences between an 
industrialized North and a lagging Mezzogiorno have been reproduced on 
the European scale, with the increased divergence between a high-tech 
industry industry in the north (Germany) and a “peripheral” Europe in the 
south with developmental problems reminiscent of those in what once was 
called the “Third World”. 
The mobility of labor is severely restricted not only by labor laws but 
above all by language barriers. The parallel with the mobility of the US labor 
market is sometimes made, but there the language barrier — even it     
exists — is much less.  
The relative strength of the state compared to the size of the economy 
of the currency area is the greatest disparity between dollar and the euro 
areas. The vast majority of the state resources in the US are on the federal 
level, the resources of the individuals states within US are less than 10% of 
the totals and largely dependent on decisions on the federal level. In the 
European Union the relations are totally reversed: the EU-budget represents 
only 1% of EU GDP, while the budgets of the member states are at ratios 
above 40% of GDP. When it comes to economic realities EU is still a 
cooperation between national states, not a confederation. And even less a 
federative state entity. 
From the start the euro-system thus suffered from being incomplete: 
there was no federal level able to balance the disparities between its 
members. And it is fair to say that the greater these disparities where, the 
greater is the need of such a countervailing force. 
The only strong federal institution EU has is the ECB, European Central 
Bank. And it’s main weapon is monetary policy — via the interest rate. But 
how to have the same thermostat for the arctic North and the Mediterranean 
countries? Such a regulation will probably be somewhere in between — 
adapted to Frankfurt, Germany, the seat of the ECB. In in fact, this is not in 
between but along the lines of the strongest. 
Is the Eurozone and adequate monetary area? The first answer on this 
question obviously is: No. It was inappropriate and unbalanced from the 
start. In fact that although the criteria for the admission into the euro zone 
were couched in strictly financial terms it was obvious that in some cases the 
decision to grant the admission was purely political. It was a Polichinella 
The continuing crisis of the euro — a weak link in the global financial system? 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 33, n. 2, p. 333-362, nov. 2012 
339
secret that the national accounts of Italy and Greece where highly unreliable, 
but it was deemed impossible to refuse either of them entry into the euro 
zone. 
The fundamental problems with the euro as a monetary area have 
grown in the last years. When weaker countries can’t shield themselves 
away from stronger industrial neighbours by devaluations they are 
competing in other ways. Ireland has lowered their corporate taxes, pulling 
companies and tax resources away from other member states. Slovakia, 
Rumania, Hungary and other new member states are competing by low 
wages. And German industries has also used competitive devices to gain 
market shares for their exports. They have been outsourcing parts of their 
production to neighbouring countries in Central Europe and when not 
pressuring wages downward leaving the labour force without any 
compensation for productivity gains. 
Instead of creating a “level playing field” each country — and each 
industrial group — is trying to cheat the others to gain advantages. The 
common result has been an erosion of consumer demand and of the tax 
basis for the member states throughout the union. With gradually increasing 
budget deficits that needs to be financed. 
And this deepening divergences within the euro zone area has proven 
to be an opportunity that the “finance industry” has seized upon. The 
continuous growth of public debt in the EU member states — especially that 
of its weaker states — has become a secure source of profit for banks and 
investment funds in a situation where other investments more oriented 
towards long term projects in the “real economy” seem unsafe.  
So what was inappropriate and unbalanced from the start has now 
become untenable. 
 
3 Why are the PIIGS-countries in debt 
crises? 
 
The so-called PIIGS-countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain) have been at the center of scrutiny when discussing the problems in 
the euro-countries. Each of them has its specific problems making them 
especially vulnerable to the vast deterioration of the international economy 
caused by the global financial crisis. But it must be stressed that the basic 
factor behind the increased public indebtedness is the general slowdown of 
the EU and US economies. 
The specific problems were different. In Greece the public debt, 
primarily caused by tax evasion and clientelism, had for a long time been 
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hidden2. In Ireland and Spain the banks had been recklessly lending to a 
building boom that crashed. In UK as in the US it was irresponsible lending 
to consumer credits and mortgages that paved the way for market slumps. 
The rapid rise of public indebtedness had however not at all the same 
consequences in Europe as in the US. Since the ECB — unlike the Federal 
Reserve in the United States — was forbidden to lend money to the member 
states they had to get loans on the open market. And these loans proved to 
be very expensive ones, especially for the weaker states. From the outset 
the banks were demanding interest rates on 6-7% but as the debts were 
increasing and the speculation on coming defaults growing they rose to 20% 
in Greek government bonds at the end of 2011. 
Both the states and the banks are in untenable situations. The financial 
institutions have reaped heavy profits the last year — it is not uncommon for 
banks to set a 15% overall profit as their goal — but for how long? How sure 
are their assets in Greek, Spanish or Irish bonds? 
In June 2011 Robert Peston, the business editor of BBC, presented the 
following picture of the risky and potentially risky assets of some banks, 
drawn from a report by Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (PESTON, 
2011) 
 
Private bank exposure of financial risk of some government bonds (billion USD ) 
Greece Ireland Portugal 
French      65$ Brittish      194$ Spanish      106$ 
US            41$ German    158$ German        50$ 
German    40$ US            105$ US                46$ 
 
As for Spain he didn’t present the full picture but mentioned that the 
exposure of the US’ banks was estimated to 179 billions $. Summing up the 
total risk exposure for these countries already then exceeded 1.000 billion $. 
This is considerably larger than the joint resources of the European Facility 
for Financial Stability (EFFS) and the projected European Stability 
Mechanism. The volumes of the risky exposures of the banks were already 
in June 2011 such that any significant default would have created havoc in 
the banking system. 
The growing public indebtedness has thus become a major source of 
profit for the private banks — but is at the same time something of a bomb 
that is ticking. 
 
                                                 
2
 Incidentally the conservative government that was brought down in 2010 was helped in this 
endeavor by the US investmente bank Goldman Sachs concealing debts as finantial 
derivatives. The present head of the Italian government, Manuel Draghi, should know all 
about this since he was one it its chief executives. 
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4 Should the euro-system be dismantled? 
 
The Eurozone is thus an artificial product, shaped by political concerns. 
A product has not lived up to its promises, that has increased tensions 
between member states and developed into a number serious indebtedness 
crises.   
Many of those who are criticizing the inconsistencies of the euro holds 
that the only sensible way out would be to break up the euro-system into 
smaller parts more adapted to the criteria of monetary unions, with more 
equal economic structures. In France this argument is heard from the left as 
well from the right. In France Bernard Cassen, the distinguished former 
editor of Le Monde Diplomatique is arguing along these lines as well as 
Jacques Nikonoff, former president of Attac-France. With somewhat different 
arguments this is also the position of Marine Le Pen, the president of the 
Front National, France’s xenophobic rightwing party and Nicolas Dupont-
d’Aignan, a nationalist in the Gaullist tradition. 
It might seem as a straightforward recipe. If Greece left the euro its 
currency would rapidly be devaluated. The exports would benefit and 
producers for the domestic market would more easily compete with import 
goods that would become more expensive. The hopefuls would say that the 
downside — that everything will be more expensive for consumers-will solve 
itself once the growth comes. But the downside is much harder than that: 
- The public debt (in euros) will immediately grow by 20-50% in the 
national currency. 
- The distrust against the ability of Greece to service the debt will lead 
to higher interest rates on Greek bonds. 
- It would probably lead to a collapse of the Greek banking system, 
with concomitant ripple effects on the real economy. The Argentine 
crisis scenario comes into mind. 
While the positive effects will come gradually the hardships will come 
within a week. 
As other French economists (Dominique Plihon and Thomas Coutrot 
from Attac France for instance) argue that the break-away would probably 
lead to a chain reaction also in the political sphere in Europe that is hard to 
calculate but where nationalistic gestures would be hard to contain. 
And of course such a measure concerns not only Greece: if one country 
breaks away — others will probably also be hurt. If we reflect a bit on the 
total risk exposure of private banks mentioned above it clearly represents not 
a regional but a systemic risk for the European banking system and beyond. 
There are thus strong reasons why the German chancellor Angela 
Merkel and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy when announcing “rescue 
packages” for Greece last autumn solemnly declared that they would never 
allow the euro system to fall apart. 
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5 The Euro-plus Pact: necessary cures or 
dead-ends? 
 
Thus, the governments of the euro-zone are decided not to allow the 
euro fall apart: but how should it be saved? Here there are two different 
outlooks confronting each other. On the one hand the presently dominating 
neo-liberal view held by current governments, the EU Commission and the 
board of the ECB. On the other, the “Keynesian” outlook developed by 
Joseph Stiglitz, the head of the official French economic research institute 
OFCE, Jean-Pierre Fitoussi and a host of other economists, most notably 
joined in a Manifesto by Appalled Economists, “Manifeste des economistes 
atterrés” published in August 2010 (FITOUSSI, 2010).  
According to the first view it is the budget deficits that are the major 
problem and which have to be dealt with first of all. Some hard years of 
austerity cures are needed to bring down the deficits but once this is done 
the confidence of the markets in the government bonds will return. Then the 
interest rates will come down and then there will be prospects for a normal 
economic growth. But it is necessary to act swiftly and vigorously to bring the 
deficits down. Cures recommended include cuts in the public employment, 
lowering of social benefits, delayed retirement age, increased taxation on 
consumption and — if necessary — wholesale privatizations of public 
assets. This is the Greek way — they are now into their eighth austerity 
package. In both Greece and Italy it proved impossible to enforce such 
drastic measures through ordinary parliamentary means, under the pressure 
from both financial markets and EU authorities situations of national 
emergency developed where “a-political” technocrats were brought intio 
head “crisis governments”. In both cases the saviors turned out to be 
bankers with close ties to banking establishment and the ECB. 
But the expediency of “emergency situations” to sidestep parliamentary 
democracy could not be relied upon continually. Since — according to 
prevailing consensus in the EU establishment — it was the budget deficits 
that were causing the vicious circles in the economy the EU Council has 
decided to take preventive action: it must be made practically impossible for 
any national parliaments to allow budget deficits.3 This is the main content of 
                                                 
3
 The one that was called for to lead the Greek government, Lucas Papademos, had been 
head of the Greek central bank, and as such responsible for the deal with Goldman Sachs 
hiding away part of the public debt in a dubious transaction. Mario Monti, the banker and 
former EU Commissioner that was brought in to replace Berlusconi as prime minister in Italy 
in November 2011, was serving as international advisor for Goldman Sachs when he was 
brought in. To complete the picture it might be mentioned that the new head of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, was international vice president of Goldman Sachs 2002-2005 before 
entering the direction of the ECB. 
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the so-called Euro-plus Pact adopted by the European Council in March 
2011.4 EU shall from now on issue guidelines concerning budgetary margins 
for each parliament to follow. If they disobey severe economic sanctions will 
follow. 
The opposite, “Keynesian” view holds that the budget deficits are only 
the symptoms of other, deeper problems that can be specific as well as of a 
general nature. The creative book-keeping in Greece and the irresponsible 
credit policies in Spain are examples of such specific causes. But the basic 
problem is of a quite different order — it is acombined effect of a 
dysfunctional construction of the euro system and derailment of an 
irresponsible “financialized” capitalism. By attacking the symptom instead of 
the problem the austerity cures will only aggravate present problems further. 
According to this view neo-liberal economists simply don’t understand the 
interplay between the public sector economy and the markets. Joseph 
Stiglitz has recently characterized the Euro-plus Pact as an “outright 
catastrophe.”  
The real circles that the austerity measures have produced have 
produced so far have been down-ward ones. The real effects of the cures — 
increased unemployment, lowered livings standards — will not bring any 
deficits down. Rather they will make the economies be grinding to a halt, 
thereby automatically lowering tax receipts and cancelling any projected 
lessening of the deficits. The financial markets — who where those who in 
the first place urged on these cuts — have been quick to notice the promised 
effects didn’t materialize — and so pushing up the interest rates of 
vulnerable countries further making a default still more likely. This is the real 
spiral we are now seeing unfolding in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy. 
Soon also in Spain and maybe in France. The social revolts we have seen 
so far are probably only just a beginning. 
Confronted with such spirals it is hard to believe that a harder, more 
elitist governance of the EU should be a tenable solution. 
 
6 The euro-crisis is to a large degree       
self-inflicted 
 
But the weaknesses of the present Euro-Plus pact has deeper roots. It 
has mainly to do with the fundamental framework of the European Monetary 
Union: the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Growth and Stability 
Pact. 
                                                 
4
 Originally an agreement between Germany and France called “Competitivity Pact”, its 
official name now is Pact for the Euro”. 
Örjan Appelqvist 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 33, n. 2, p. 333-362, nov. 2012 
344
They stipulate among other things that the gross debt ratio to GDP 
should not be higher than 60% and that the budget deficits not should be 
allowed to exceed 3% of GDP. 
These figures were sealed off hand in a discussion between mainly 
French and German bankers and were advanced by the officials of the 
German Bundesbank as a precondition for giving up the sovereignty of the 
D-mark. It has often been said that they were driven by the fear of inflation, 
justified by the experience of the hyperinflation in the 1920’s. May be so, but 
it is more salient to their criteria as a way of continuing the monetary policies 
of the strong D-mark. This had long been the monetary tool for German 
industrial policy: the strong D-mark meant a continuous pressure on labour 
costs and productivity to sustain an export driven economy. Now this recipe 
was applied to a monetary area where employment structure and 
productivity levels where quite different. 
These Maastricht criteria are now accepted as sacrosanct by the EU 
and ECB establishment. The German chancellor Angela Merkel and other 
leading politician are talking about them and the “Golden Rule” of the Euro 
Plus Pact as if they were part of the Ten Commandments. But outside these 
closed quarters more and more economists and concerned citizens are 
asking themselves: why should 60% be a definite level the debt ratio? Japan 
has managed to have debt rations of more than 100% without creating 
chaos a long time now. And the US Treasury continues to sell low yield 
government bonds to the Fed even if their gross debt is over 100%. 
And even if a relative low level of deficits generally might be considered 
as preferable, how could the target of 3% in a time of economic crisis be 
presented as precondition for growth and not its possible result? This 
“golden rule” of a rapid return seems all the more ideologically biased since it 
advocates that the major effort should come from cuts in public expenditures 
or sellout of public assets. 
 
7 The focus on public debt and deficits: a 
logical and ideological incoherence 
 
Today the whole focus of the media put on the indebtedness of 
individual states. But what happens if we compare it with that of the other 
actors, the banks for instance? This was done recently by the French 
economist Bernard Vallage as, using the official French statistics published 
by the INSEE. 
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Financial assets and liabilities in France (billions €). 
Situation of different agents in December 2009 
 
Economic agent Gross debt (billions €) 
Shareof 
gross debt 
Financial 
assets 
(billions €) 
Net debt 
(billions €) 
Total national economy 20.631 100% 20.598 33 
Public agents (state, 
municipalities, social 
insurance system) 
1.841 9% 873 968 
Financial institutions 
(banks, funds) 10.580 51% 10.947 -367 
Non-financial institutions 
(corporate sector) 6.884 33% 4.945 1.939 
Households 1.301 6% 3.703 -2.402 
Non-profit institutions 
(associations) 23  68 -45 
SOURCE: INSEE This statistics is clearly showing three things: 
1. If we are talking about gross debt is that of the banks that was the problem in France. It 
represents 51% of the whole, the public debt only 9%. 
2. If on the other hand we look on the net debt it is the corporate debt that seems to be 
the most vulnerable, since it represents two-thirds of the net liabilities. 
3. The net public liabilities were only half of the gross debt. 
 
Obviously it is foolish not to take the financial assets into the picture 
when discussing public debts in Europe but this is what the criteria of the EU 
economic treaties are doing. The Maastricht criteria concerning debt ratios is 
only concerned about the gross debt, neither the public financial assets nor 
the public material assets are taken into account. 
From a banker’s normal point of view this is illogical, when judging the 
creditworthiness of an industrial firm or a household it is self-evident that the 
financial resources and other assets also enter into the judgment. 
This lack of logic is not fortuitous, it is ideologically motivated. It stems 
from the neo-classical — and neo-liberal — view of the market as the 
“natural” economy and the public sector as a regrettable but sometimes 
unavoidable exception to this state of nature. By exaggerating the public 
indebtedness and by forcing the member states to turn to the private 
financial markets to cover their current expenditures the rules established for 
the ECB are putting a strait-jacket on the public sector while at the same 
time providing a safe profit-machine for the finance industry.  
Who is vulnerable in the French economy, as depicted by the available 
statistics? If we apply the same way of analyzing the situation of the banks 
as we use when analyzing the states we will undoubtedly find that in the vast 
majority of EU states the gross indebtedness of the financial institutions is by 
far exceeding that of the public sector, we will find that their capital base is 
by far much weaker than that of the national state and that the safe earnings 
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of the banks are much weaker than those of the state. In fact the average 
capital base5 of the European banks is between 5 and 8%. 
This means that their outstanding liabilities are more than ten times as 
great as their assets proper.6 Moreover, given their heavy engagement in 
derivatives of all orts it is evident that their assets are valued on extremely 
shaky grounds. Current valuations of commodity prices, interest rates, 
currency relations, stocks — all are at the mercy of sudden shocks. The BIS’ 
report of June 2011(BIS, 2012) estimated the sum of the risk exposure of the 
banks to the PIIGS countries to be around 1.000 billion USD. But this is only 
a tiny part of the total risk exposure of the banks.According to current BIS 
statistics the “ultimate risk exposure” for the banking system in late 2011 was 
considered to amount to 16,9 trillion USD. Of the “consolidated claims” the 
CDS trade represented 55% and the derivatives of different kinds 25% (BIS, 
2012). 
The banks do what they always do in times of crises: they try to lessen 
their risk exposure, they deleverage. From a position of massive 
overextension they are increasing pressures on their customers by 
increasing the interest rate spreads between deposits and credits and 
downsizing credit lines to enterprises and households but most of all the are 
trying to cut down their losses, selling off toxic assets to careless speculators 
or central banks. 
Evidently it is the banking system that is in an extremely vulnerable 
position, and when still pursuing its speculative activities in order to reap 
maximum profits it does so recklessly banking on the governments rescue 
should they fail. 
 
8 The banker’s great fear: credit crunch 
 
Even if the general opinion is above all preoccupied with discussions on 
public deficits the banking world is fully aware about where the real and most 
dangerous vulnerability is situated: it is in the generally high level of risk 
exposure of the banks in a situation of prolonged economic stagnation and 
most specifically in the entangled web of inter-bank relations. 
In the boom years of credit expansion the banks were heavily using a 
day-to-day lending system to increase their credit facilities. Prior to the 
Lehman crisis Federal Reserve estimated that as much as 40% of the 
                                                 
5
 The ratio between its most safe assets (common equity +Tier 1 capital) and it’s total Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWA).The present requirements according to the Basel III criteria 
demands this ratio to be 7-9,5%. 
6
 Since total amount of risk-weighted assets and its common equity and Tier 1 capital are 
corresponding to the gross outstanding liabilities. 
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overall profits of the major US banks were the result of these interbank day-       
-trading activities. 
The rapid rise of this trade was dependent on the mutual confidence 
between the banks: that the collaterals provided for the loan were in fact 
genuine and not “toxic”: overvalued or carrying hidden liabilities. The LIBOR7 
interest rate was a measure of the degree of confidence, any hike in these 
rate signifying an increased wariness an loss of confidence between major 
actors in finance. The Lehman Brothers crash was a heavy blow to this 
trade, LIBOR rates surged an the interbank lending virtually came to a 
standstill. From a situation of very easy access to credits it became virtually 
impossible to have access to short term credits, what was called a “credit 
crunch”. It can be resembled to a heart attack in the arterial system of global 
finance. It was to avert a total breakdown that the Federal Reserve and the 
US government, together with its western European counterparts, massively 
injected liquidities into the major banks in the autumn 2008 and in the first 
months of 2009. 
Although the acute credit crunch was thus averted in 2008 the basic 
fragility of the banks still persists. The banks have indeed recovered and 
returned to high profits — thanks to the guarantees offered by the various 
governments — but as the BIS statistics shows financial instruments of 
speculative nature still represents an important part of the structure of their 
underlying assets. The fear of a possible credit crunch has not disappeared 
since the mutual confidence between be major banks has not returned. Such 
a credit crunch it could be triggered by almost any dramatic event of political 
or economic nature in the present situation of insecurity. In the crisis strategy 
of the direction of the ECB this fear of new credit crunch represents a major 
obstacle. Their strategy is based on a rapid return to “normal” market 
conditions after the “abnormal” interventions in 2008-2009. This fear of credit 
crunch distorts — and potentially disrupts — the market mechanisms 
whereby proper prices were to set on all tradable goods, be it commodities 
or financial instruments. So in a situation where confidence between bankers 
was low the central banks had to assure liquidity by all necessary means. As 
tensions grew over possible defaults of Greece and Spain last autumn the 
ECB decided to put 1.000 billion € at the disposal of the private banking 
sector, in two tranches emitted in December2011 and February 2012. These 
loans were given with a long maturity (3 years) and at a very low interest rate 
(1%). 
This was not an isolated event — it was only another step in a long 
sequence changing the role of the central banks in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis and even prior to that. In an article discussing the changing 
role of the central banks Christophe Blot (BLOT, 2012), an economist 
                                                 
7
 London Interbank Offered Rate, the average interest rate that leading banks in London 
charge when lending to other banks.  
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working at the French research institute OFCE, has showed how massively 
the gross volume of the ECB monetary assets have risen since 2002. Prior 
to the Lehman crisis its ratio to the Eurozone GDP was 14% but with these 
last efforts of “quantitative easing” it has risen to 3.023 billion €, a GDP ratio 
of 31%. 8 
This means that by providing such vast amounts of liquidity the ECB is 
effectively if not replacing the inter-bank day-trading markets at least putting 
its market pricing out of function. The ECB is assuring the liquidity of the 
day-trading market and it does so at the price of itself becoming a major 
actor in the financial markets. An active role in spite of its professed neo-      
-liberal dogma of a hands-off role, solely concerned with price stability. 
There is thus a drastic divergence in the current dominant EU discourse 
on economic policy: while the discussion in the public sphere and the solemn 
commitments of government to the Euro Plus pact have been dominated but 
the need of austerity measures to cut down public expenditures the 
monetary policies of the ECB have thus been characterized by an extreme 
laxity towards the banking system giving them almost limitless access to 
virtually free credits. 
The idea is that this monetary expansion should encourage the return 
to “normal economic growth” by restoring the proper working of the market 
mechanisms in the financial sector. 
This was based on the simple assumption that when interests are 
lowered investments will grow. But what if the crucial factor for industrial 
investments is not the availability of credits but that of demand? What if 
households in times of general insecurity are foremost concerned with 
lowering their liabilities (consumer credits or mortgages)? 
In such a situation is rather more probable that banks will use their easy 
credit for hoarding or speculating. And this is indeed what has happened. 
Since the basic rate for deposits in the ECB is above 3% financial institutions 
that have access to the ECB liquidity can relocate easy credits as deposits 
while waiting for secure investment opportunities to arise. According to the 
OFCE chief economist Henry Sterdyniak the ECB deposits of the banks rose 
from 169 billion € to 1.156 billion € between January 2007 and March 2012 
(STERDYNIAK, 2012). 
And the other line of conduct for the financial actors in a time of 
economic stagnation is to make speculative bets. In the stock market it is 
made by financial actors with excess liquidity: through “Aquisitions and 
Mergers” (A&M) windfall profits can be reaped by restructuring, cost-cutting 
and closing down industrial plants. But a larger source of profits is to be 
found in the market of financial derivatives and Credit Default Swaps. 
                                                 
8
 The corresponding ratios for the Fed was 7% (2007) and 19% (2011). The BCE ratio 2011 
was 24%. 
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This is where the combined effect of the specific rules for the ECB and 
the ever growing complexity of financial globalization have produced new 
and unintended results. 
 
9 The statutes of the European Central Bank 
and the interest rate scam 
 
By virtue of its statutes the European Central Bank is forbidden to come 
to the rescue of the members of the euro zone in the way that the US 
Federal Reserve supports the US Treasury or the Japanese Central Bank 
supports its Japanese equivalent. 
The Euro countries thus have to go to the open market to sell their 
bonds while the Fed through their various quantitative easing procedures is 
giving the US government virtually free access to liquidity.  
In the beginning this peculiar feature of the ECB was explained by the 
need of budgetary discipline to be enforced in all countries — countries 
which had been “spending beyond their means” should be forced to pay a 
price, the interest rate on the financial markets, for their irresponsibility. But 
with the development of the “insurance industry” in the financial sector the 
picture has changed dramatically. With the rise of new techniques in the 
derivatives markets — selling short speculating on rising interest rates, 
speculating on national defaults via Credit Default Swaps and so on — the 
differences between different interest rates have risen dramatically and 
thereby also the windfall profits reaped by traders. 
 
As an illustration can be given the differential rates  
as theypresented themselves in June 2011: 
 
Type of credit, equity Interest rate June 2011 
3 yr credit from ECB to private banks  1/1,5% 
German bond yield 1,8% 
US, UK bond yield 2,8% 
French bond yield 3,5% 
EFFS lending rates to Greece(on conditions) 4,2% 
Open market rates for Greece 18% 
 
What this amounted to was a real interest scam where private banks 
had virtually free access to cheap liquidity that could be used to speculate 
against a coming Greek default, a default being all the more probable 
because of the volumes in the CDS trade against Greece. And the “rescue 
packages” delivered to the Greek government by the Eurozone stability    
fund — on condition that they obey the instructions on budgetary policy 
given by the IMF/ECB/EC troika — were in fact also quite lucrative for the 
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fund providers (Germany, France) since it gave them a yield considerably 
above their own bonds.  
If you look at this interest rate scam there is one simple question to ask: 
why are the euro-zone states back bound by severe rules while the banks 
are to be saved at all costs? Why should the citizens be punished for deficits 
they have not caused while the banks are allowed to create speculate 
insurance instruments without ever being forced to take responsibility for 
their recklessness? 
 
10 Back to the larger picture — a phase in 
the global deleveraging of finance capital 
 
Before answering these questions we will have to return to the larger 
picture. As I stated in the beginning the “euro crisis” although it has its 
specific features must be seen apart of a general crisis of the global financial 
system. 
This can best be characterized as a result of an over-extension of the 
credit — creation in the private banking system. A privatization of the right to 
print money, to put it a bit simplified. Through globalization of financial 
markets and deregulation within the finance sector the banks have been 
totally free to extend their credits and increase the volume of their lending 
and loaning. 
The part that has risen most spectacularly is the Over-the-counter 
(OTC) transactions, transactions outside the major exchange places and 
outside even their very slack regulations. According to current statistics by 
the Bank for International Settlements the OTC derivatives market is 
covering notional amounts adding up to 648 trillion USD (a figure roughly ten 
times the annual Global GDP) at an estimated market worth of 27 trillion 
USD (BIS, 2012). Although the sum of these assurances and bets are 
adding up bets and counterparts in intricate chains it is likely that they in 
many cases represents commitments impossible to discharge.  
As the French example above shows it is reasonable to argue that it is 
not the states that are basically vulnerable in this situation — they have large 
material and financial assets at their disposal, they have means to secure a 
steady and even rising flow of resources through taxation. As the case of the 
US shows they can even sometimes afford running large deficits for a long 
period of time, provided there is confidence in the relative stability of their 
economy. What really makes them vulnerable is rather that the political 
authorities in the major countries (US, EU and Japan) are allowing 
speculative devices such as Credit Default Swaps to be used against weaker 
states without coordinated measures of defense. 
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The real vulnerability clearly lies with the banking system. It is easy to 
see why economic journalists in general are avoiding this evidence: talking 
openly about the vulnerability of specific financial actors immediately 
increases their vulnerability. One might say that talking about this general 
level of vulnerability increases the likelihood of a financial crash while hiding 
the fact is falsely reassuring and thus increases the dimension of such a 
crash. 
This extreme vulnerability of the banking system is not an individual 
psychological feature of the bankers and traders in BNP-Paribas, Goldman 
Sachs, Bears Stearns or any individual investment bank or hedge fund — 
although there has been a lot of cases of reckless gambling in these circles. 
The recent loss of 2 billion USD by a trader in JP Morgan shows that the 
string of spectacular gambling losses is not over. The general vulnerability is 
however much more the consequence of a long process of privatized credit 
creation through the ingenious production of opaque and ever more 
sophisticated “financial instruments”.  
I’ve mentioned the volumes in the derivatives trading: it is evident that 
should there be a systemic miscalculation of this network of educated 
guesses the number of defaults and write-downs will be innumerable. 
A factor that is complicating this process even further is the deep cross-     
-border integration of financial flows. According to current statistics Cross-     
-border claims amounted to 31,1 trillion USD (for reference Global GDP 
2011 was 62 trillion USD). A large part of these claims (51%) were short 
term claims, which means that any major disturbance would rapidly ripple 
through the international financial system. 
Evidently this picture of the volumes and the depth of international 
interdependencies is ripe with struggles exacerbated by conflicting national 
interests. The sum is adding up to an intractable mess of vulnerable credits 
and uncovered assurances. It is forcibly reminding an observer of the 
wayKeynescharacterized the situation after WW I:  
[…] the vast paper entanglements which are our legacy from 
war finance both at home and abroad. The war has ended with 
every one owing everyone else immense sums of money. 
Germany owes a large sum to the Allies, the Allies owe a large 
sum to Great Britain, and Great Britain owes a large sum to the 
United States. The holders of war loan in every country are 
owed a large sum by the State, and the State in its turn is owed 
a large sum by these and other taxpayers. The whole position is 
in the highest degree artificial, misleading, and vexatious. We 
shall never be able to move again, unless we can free our limbs 
from these paper shackles. (KEYNES, 2012). 
The present situation is of course far from analogous but “the vast 
entanglement” is even more crippling today. As with every round of 
deleveraging and bankruptcies the prime question is: who will pay? In this 
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the first round the EU establishment have settled for the most obvious 
choice: the citizens and their systems of social welfare. 
But if the economic stagnation in Europe continues and deepens into 
recession it would seem probable that will see intricate bankruptcies and 
heightened national conflicts not only with the European Union but also 
between financial centers in US, Europe and Asia. 
 
11 The healthy way out: why there is an 
excellent basis for a socially, 
ecologically sustainable European 
development 
 
The Eurozone countries are thus caught in a destructive maelstrom at 
the moment. But is there a way out? A growing number of European 
economists think there is.9 
If we only lift our eyes from the turmoil of interest rate speculations and 
debt ratios it is easy to see that countries of the European Union have in fact 
formidable assets to build on should they choose to. They are possessing an 
enormous richness in terms of cultural, technological and social assets. They 
have highly sophisticated production apparatuses with a highly skilled labor 
force. This is also shown in the area’s international trade relations: the EU 
economy as a whole is running a trade surplus and its consumer market is of 
great attraction for their trading partners. 
Taken together these countries have great synergies, based on the 
regional division of labor that has evolved since the 19th century. 60% of the 
international trade of the EU countries are intra-regional. This deep level of 
integration is making the euro countries self-sufficient in a lot of areas. 
Furthermore, the economic successes of the European countries during 
the latter part of the 20th century were built on social models regulated 
through interplay between corporate executives and trade unions, between 
the state and the companies in the industrial sector. 
An as noted above — it is not the states that are vulnerable, should 
they act together. 
                                                 
9
 Impossible to give justice to these debates here. Let me only mention three networks that 
have been inspiring for me. The Euro-Memorandum Group, a network assembling some 
sixty active e scholars from more than ten EU-countries, has been developing a Keynesian 
agenda for more than ten years. The German research institute WEED is combining 
ecological concerns with acute analysis on financial policies. And recently the manifesto of  
Appalled Economists in France has developed into an network organizing more than 2.000 
scholars and professionals.  
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The governments of the euro countries — especially when working 
together — have a creditworthiness by far exceeding that of the private 
sector. The Greek government is of course in a situation that is different from 
that of the German government but if the euro-countries would abandon the 
unrealistic and self-defeating criteria of the Lisbon Treaty a new range of 
possibilities would be open. 
And finally — the European Union as a whole is not like the US 
dependent on borrowing hundreds of billions of US dollars each year to 
sustain its economy. As I have shown above there are in fact two reasons 
why the euro countries also ought to be able to surmount the crisis: Firstly 
because the acute dimension of the crisis to a large degree is self-inflicted 
and secondly because the actual framework rests on a logical, ideologically 
biased incoherence.   
 
12 What might be the basics of a common 
solution on the Euro-crisis? 
 
How then to use all the fantastic human, technological and economic 
assets that these countries have?10 
The very first measure would be to make the ECB serve the peoples 
and their governments. ECB should not be the institution that is helping the 
banks and investment funds to plunder the weaker members of the 
European Union. The ECB should buy government bonds on a massive 
scale at a low and fixed interest rate. This means suspending the articles 
101 and 104 of their statute3s.11 
Secondly — speculation on government default should be 
prohibited. The so-called Credit Default Swaps are illusory and destructive 
devices only serving short terms gains. Destructive because they are self-      
-fulfilling prophecies, illusory because the “insurers” are never able to stand 
by their commitments should a national default actually happen. Those who 
are buying bonds must themselves take the risks involved — after all that’s 
why they get interests. 
A third measure would be profound tax reform beginning with a 
return of the taxation on fortunes. It would signal a return to the earlier 
                                                 
10
 The suggestions that follow does not claim originality. I’m relying on arguments developed 
by French economists such as Husson, Coutrot and Plihon (2012) and Euro Memorandum 
Group, 2012.  
11
 The articles 101 and 104 of the Lisbon Treaty concerns the rules for managing public sector 
deficits and public debt ratios and are explicitly excluding direct purchases of government 
bonds by the ECB. The Lisbon Treaty was signed in November 2007 and is in function 
since 2009. 
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social capitalism in Europe where not only the wage-earner but also the rich 
had some civic responsibility towards the societies where they live. In 2007 
3,1 million households in the euro countries had more than 750.000 € in 
financial assets. Taken together their assets amounted to 7.300 billion €, 
which was more than the combine public debts of their countries. Evidently it 
is necessary to have a comprehensive taxation reform. 
Apart from these immediate measures there is a need of a fundamental 
change of paradigm in our way of thinking how growth and development 
should come about. A rapid growth in public employment is the safest 
way to create virtuous circles in the economies, both in terms of GDP growth 
and public budgets. As was understood before neo-liberalism, public 
expenditure does not crowd out private investments in times of vast 
unemployment. 
But to put Europe on the road of an ecologically and socially 
sustainable long term development more is needed. What is needed is 
coherently planned, massive and prolonged investments in 
infrastructure, health and educations services in all the EU member states. 
In order to secure the long term financing of such an effort a fifth measure is 
needed: Emission by the ECB, EIB or another European agency of euro — 
or Union bonds on a massive scale on a low and fixed yield.12 Bonds that 
banks should be stipulated o hold as a part of their capital base. They would 
also be widely accepted as a safe investment. 
Of course these measures would also entail a re-establishment of the 
public control over the capital markets and specifically transactions 
with tax havens. There is an ongoing discussion between radical 
economists about what to do with the finance: regulate or curtail? For some 
time there seemed to be a large consensus — even including parts of the 
dominant economists like Martin Wolf in Financial Times — for the case of 
regulation of finance. But what regulations? And how? 
What have been accomplished so far, the BIS’s proposals for bank 
regulation (the so called Basel III criteria) seems if not counterproductive at 
least totally incapable of coping with systemic events. I’m inclined to agree 
with the French economist Frédéric Lordon: they main principle should not 
be “supervise and correct” but “forbid and punish”.13 
To make the commercial banks return to their original function the 
separation between commercial banks and investment banks has to be 
hermetic, not cosmetic. And investment banks should make their bets on 
their own, expecting no aid from public authorities. Apart from measures 
concerning the financial sector nothing of the measures above is really 
questioning the market economy or the existence of private companies. It is 
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 The idea is very well exposed by Hollandin (2011). 
13
 Frédéric Lordon:”Léffarante passivité de la ’ré-régulation’ finacière” in Sterdyniak, H. (et al) 
Changerd’économie! Nos propositions pour 2012(Liens qui libèrent, 2011). 
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merely a question of recreating a kind of balance between state and 
markets, between labor and capital. 
These measures would make Europe once again look like a place of 
modernity. 
Still nothing — or almost nothing- of all this is likely to happen in the 
short run.  
And the reason is political.  
 
13 Why the European governments still will 
be unable to find common solutions 
 
There was a moment when a fundamental change seemed possible — 
immediately after the crash of Lehmann Brothers in 2008. Then all 
governments were “Keynesian”. But since then the only real concern of 
governments to be to “reassure the markets”. 
What we are witnessing at the moment is not a return of Keynesian 
policies but a new wave of neo-liberalism, more authoritarian, more 
disciplinary than the former one. It bears strong resemblances with the 
deflationary path that the governments in US, UK and France were pursuing 
after 1929. 
What is also worrying is that this is accompanied by a growing 
exploitation of national prejudices to support this new agenda. Mainstream 
media in stronger EU economies are actually exacerbating the national 
conflicts by blaming the populations in the PIIGS-countries for the general 
problems of the Eurozone. Short sighted nationalist feelings are thus on the 
rise in many parts of Europe. The populist party of “True finlanders” in 
Finland don’t want to help “lazy Greeks” and Irish anymore. The German 
general public also thinks they have done enough sacrifices for EU members 
in the periphery when the only ones for whom they — at least the working 
class — have made sacrifices are the wealthy shareholders and the banks. 
Economic journalists in general bears a heavy responsibility for this 
development since they are routinely making false analogies between the 
management of a household’s economy and that of a whole country. Instead 
of explaining the intricate interrelationship of trade balances and budgets 
within the EU Eurozone’s problems are boiled down to simplistic questions of 
honesty (“paying ones debts”) and responsibility (“not living beyond one’s 
means”). 
There are indeed differences in national experiences and outlooks that 
partly explains why common solutions are being blocked. The British 
government is absolutely against capital controls and taxation on financial 
transaction because they think this might endanger the situation of the 
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world’s largest tax haven: The City of London. The German government and 
leading German bank officials adamantly refuses to let ECB support the 
member countries directly since they think that would weaken the euro and 
lessen the budgetary discipline and increase the danger of inflation. 
But still more important is the problem of the strength of vested 
interests. The role of the industrial lobbies, notably the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists, in the decision making within the EU have long been subject 
to hard criticism from NGOs and trade unions. There are reasons to believe 
that the ruling networks in the banking industry is exercising an even more 
dominant role in the strategic decisions of the EU Commission. There are 
strong personal links between the banking world and the EU authorities, 
bankers in executive positions get appointed to senior posts in the EU 
bureaucracy and top EU officials become ‘senior advisers’ to the biggest 
banks when they leave office. This is especially visible in times of crisis: as 
noted above the newly appointed prime ministers of Greece and Italy and of 
the ECB all had close links to the investment bank Goldman Sachs. When 
the European Union created a separate commission to propose a bank 
reform21 of the 23 members are professional bankers. In the so-called de 
Laroisière-group that is working on a new financial architecture 4 out of 8 are 
actual or former employees of Goldman Sachs, Citigroup or BNP Paribas. It 
is rather unlikely that any serious new approach curtailing the finance 
industry will come from these gentlemen. 
It would be unfair not to mention that there are a lot of progressive 
efforts in the European Parliament and in various commissions to re-regulate 
and introduce new taxes. But the pattern is nevertheless clear good 
proposals are invariably watered down. There is only remnants left of the 
proposed Financial Transaction Tax, the issue of Eurobonds is diluted into 
“Project bonds” with much lesser potential, and so on. It is to be feared that 
the same thing will happen with the growth stimulus that the newly elected 
French president François Hollande want to add to the Euro Plus Pact. 
The European Integration project promised an “ever closer union” 
between the peoples of Europe. What it has produced so far, with its 
bureaucracy — some 30.000 officials strong — looks more like a new 
Versailles. And as receptive to popular demands as the old one. 
 
14 The euro — a weak link in the 
architecture of global finance? 
 
We are actually witnessing a very dramatic time in Europe. The 
pressure that the financial markets have been able to put on vulnerable 
economies have already produced the implosion of the governments in 
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Greece and Italy and more are perhaps to come. The democracy is in reality 
being put on hold by the dictates of the EU/ECB/IMF-troika. The agenda of 
the EU, ECB and the German government seems absolutely clear: more 
austerity even at the price of recession.  
In view of this formidable fortress defending the euro and the Euro Plus 
Pact that is supposed to defend it, in spite of all difficulties, the most likely 
scenario is that the European Union will go through a prolonged period of 
economic stagnation and increased inner tensions, as a return of the vicious 
dynamics between “center” and “periphery”. These difficulties will in fact by 
some be seen as the “cure” necessary to overcome its illness, a proof that 
the economy is on the right path to recovery. Such a process with 
furthermore have its vociferous supporters since it will come with a by-          
-product: large scale privatizations at bargain prices and with windfall profits. 
Should such a pattern prevail it with entail a recomposition of the regulation 
of the fabric of the European economies: a deepening of the neo-liberal 
character of social systems and a further strengthening of the power of 
finance capital over that of the “real economy”. 
There is however two factors that are undermining such a prospect. 
The first one is the voracity and impunity of speculative capital. Some 
government officials are talking about the need of a ten year long process. 
But is this time scale is compatible with that of the financial markets? We 
have already seen how swift the financial markets were to react on the 
“threat” of a referendum on the Greek debt last year. And when the Greek 
people were called to new elections in June — with the possible prospect of 
a majority refusing to accept the terms of the EU/IMF/BCE “rescue   
package” — Greek papers reported that sums equivalent of one trillion euros 
left the Greek banking system within a couple of days.  
Even if the banking system as a whole stands to gain by the Euro Plus 
Pact individual financial actors will inevitably gain windfall profits by attacking 
fixed rules that are unsustainable. By using the financial instruments at their 
disposal they are like wolves attacking the most vulnerable members of a 
flock of lambs. Currently it is Greece that is under attack, but there are other 
suitable targets coming up should the Greeks be subdued: Italian and 
Spanish banks are only too obvious examples.  
In the absence of any coherent measures by the ECB and the EU 
governments against the speculative attacks not only on the weaker euro 
countries but also of vulnerable banks it is hard to see how major defaults 
can be avoided. 
The other factor undermining the EU establishment’s consensus on the 
austerity policies of the Euro Plus Pact is the fundamentally national 
character of democratic legitimacy. The various institutions of the European 
Union taken together effectively wield an enormous power over individual 
Örjan Appelqvist 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 33, n. 2, p. 333-362, nov. 2012 
358
member countries, through treaties and pacts binding individual 
governments to specific obligations.  
And the governance in the EU is so intricate that is can successfully 
blunt any proposition advanced from below. But the EU institutions have this 
power only as long as the individual governments play by the rules. 
Any government that is invested by a strong democratic mandate, be it 
through elections or popular referendums, has the choice of refusing to 
accept previous agreements. The experiences made by Argentine and 
Iceland shows that this creates situation where relationship of forces 
changes drastically. If any government with the euro zone would undertake 
such a measure, enacting an immediate moratorium on debt payments, 
events would drastically illustrate the fragility of federal pretentions of the 
European Monetary Union. Such a unilateral step would unleash a process 
of which only the initial developments can be imagined here. 
Financially, a moratorium by say Greece, would not only lead to the 
immediate bankruptcy of Greek banks — or more probably, their 
nationalization and a host of measures to defend the Greek economy. It 
would also mean severe blows to French and German banks, forcing their 
respective governments to intervene. 
Politically the difficulties of the EU authorities to meet such a challenge 
would be obvious. What could they do? Expel the country? Punish it 
economically? There are hardly any formal procedures prepared to handle 
such a situation. A more probable outcome would be a rapid — and real — 
renegotiation of terms in the way Iceland managed to renegotiate in 2010.  
What is outlined there is a dramatic process with ripple effects not only 
financially but also politically: as recent elections in Europe have shown 
there is a growing popular resentment against current austerity policies in 
the European Union. Should any single country dare to unilaterally confront 
the dominant nexus of finance and EU bureaucracy it will probably meet a 
favourable echo in other parts of the Union. 
Should either of these two developments occur the outcome would 
certainly lead to important changes of the current international system of 
finance. In view of this it seems reasonable to say: yes the Eurozone crisis is 
a weak link in the system of global finance. 
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15 Some implications of the euro zone crisis 
for theoretical issues in political 
economy. The need to reconsider the 
concepts of debts, monetary creation 
and national accounting 
 
When talking about the chaotic financial situation in Europe after WW I 
subsequent to the catastrophic settlement of war reparations Keynes 
characterized it as a “vast entanglement with everyone owing everyone else 
immense sums of money”. What he thought was needed to get out of such 
an “artificial, misleading and vexatious” position was to reconsider the terms 
of these financial relations: “we shall never be able to move again unless we 
free our limbs from these paper shackles”. This imperative holds also today: 
the combined effects of reckless overexpansion of global finance, production 
of financial “weapons of mass destruction” and large scale rescue operations 
by governments in the US and EU are indeed vexatious and have created a 
vast entanglement from which there is no issue unless major 
reconsiderations on theoretical issues are made. There is indeed a lot of 
“paper shackles” that we need to free ourselves from. In conclusion I would 
like to highlight three such issues: our understandings of debts, monetary 
creation and national accounting. 
Debt is commonly — especially in the dominant discourse in EU — 
viewed as a one-sided obligation: once you’ve contracted a debt you’re 
bound to pay interest rates and down payments due. But inspired but the 
debt audit organized by the government of Ecuador and by economists in 
CADTM (the Center for Annulment of Debts of the Third World) social 
movements in Europe have raised the questions of illegitimate and odious 
debts. How the debt is contracted is important and between which parties: it 
is by no means evident that third parties — such as citizens — should be 
forced to pay for debts contracted without their consent. Moreover debt is 
clearly a double-sided obligation: bankers who allow credits on terms that 
they know are unsustainable must bear the risk for doing so. After all the 
interest rate is supposed to be the price paid for taking that risk. Debt is 
sometimes also a relation that has a moral component: the war debts 
contracted by UK through the Lend-Lease-Agreements with US during WW 
II where in fact impossible to repay after the war, there were accordingly 
cancelled in 1945. (Not without conditions, but that is another story.) 
More than a financial obligation a debt represent a power relation. It is 
however not as one-sided as creditors want people to believe. There is the 
question of size. As a common proverb says: “When you owe the bank a 
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thousand dollars you have a problem, when you owe it a million the bank 
has a problem.” The debtor may always seem to be in the weak position but 
to the extent that the debtor can incur damage on the creditor it is the debtor 
that is in a position of force. This is for instance evident in the case of a 
possible default in Greece: such an event would certainly produce very 
damaging chain reactions far outside the Greek borders. A full awareness of 
this double-sided vulnerability — and political use of it — could probably be 
used to enforce real renegotiations between financial institutions and 
indebted countries in many places. 
A second concept that has to be rethought is that of money — or that of 
money, credits and monetary creation. We may have left the old notion of 
the value of money as something tied to the value of gold but there is still a 
very quantitative understanding of money dominating. The idea that “printing 
money” will inevitably lead to inflation is an expression of that thought. This 
is also reflected in discussions about budget policies: “there is no money left” 
has been a current outcry each time the national accounts are showing 
deficits. This certainty made a pause in 2008-2009 when governments in the 
US and Europe suddenly found resources amounting to 9.600 billion USDin 
loans and guarantees to save the financial system and their economies from 
collapsing. Even if the old tune is back in Euro-land it is an event that should 
not so easily be forgotten. In fact ‘money’ is only to a small degree a physical 
thing, the vast amount of it is electronically processed evaluations of assets 
and liabilities resting on the confidence between the contracting parties. The 
majority of monetary creation the last thirty years has not been the result of 
“money printing” of central banks but of decisions of credit expansion in the 
private financial industry. Vast amounts of “assets” have thus been created 
during periods of economic growth, only rapidly to evaporate in times of 
crisis. There is a close relation between credits and confidence. Banks have 
used the confidence they enjoyed under ideologically favourable conditions 
to expand their credit volumes — and thus their economic power. 
Sometimes reasonably, sometimes recklessly. The time has now come to 
fully realize the credit-creating power of governments. Popular confidence in 
democratically elected governments when they advance long term planning 
for investments projects that the citizens view as just and sustainable give 
these governments a creditworthiness that can financially sustains such 
projects. Moreover, such projects have a potential of creating sustainable 
growth far beyond the limits actually accepted. Just as the wartime needs 
gave the governments a mandate to finance the war time efforts by imposing 
a forced saving by war bonds held by banks and households similar 
measures can be taken now. Governments should think otherwise on 
monetary creation than to go begging on the financial markets.  
Finally the whole question of budget deficits needs to be reconsidered. 
The Stiglitz-Fitoussi report in 2009 eloquently demonstrated how inadequate 
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the actual growth measures are to show economic development in a 
broader, more qualitative sense. This goes also for the current system of 
national accounting: it is utterly incapable of showing the qualitative 
development with vast sectors such as health services, education and 
research. What is even more important in the discussions about budget 
deficits is the traditional distinction it makes between current consumption 
and investments. All costs for education and health services and the majority 
of publicly financed research routinely fall under the heading of costs for 
current expenditures. This stems from the old view that the private market 
economy is the real economy while the public sector expenditures as a 
whole are a cost that is regrettably necessary but has to be kept as low as 
possible. But what if national wealth is not created by material production but 
by the interplay between sectors of production and reproduction? What if 
education and other social services are not consumption costs but 
investments in “human capital”? Then these costs evidently have to be 
evaluated not on the yearly basis but on the long term effect it is considered 
to have on each country’s national wealth, not only material but also human 
and moral. It is of course extremely difficult to construct a new national 
accounting system along these lines but the artificial and prejudiced 
terminology of the present system ought at least to be emphasized. 
The coming phase of the current process of crisis in the global financial 
and economic system will probably see massive write downs of finance 
capital. It is quite possible that we will see a period of heightened geopolitical 
tensions: between emerging powers and declining hegemons, inside each 
area and with diverging regional dynamics in South America, Asia, US and 
Europe. If we are to avoid that such tensions degenerate there is a need for 
a internationally organized public sector- driven credit creation for projects 
for an ecologically and socially just growth lessening social and regional 
inequalities. So far, however, the prospects for such a development seem 
bleak. 
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